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I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v.
United States Patent & Trademark Office1 (AMP), the attack on the
genetics patent regime has reached a crescendo.  While the ruling in
AMP was startling to most in the genetics industry,2 pressure from
critics of gene sequence patenting has been building for the last dec-
ade.  Concerns raised by gene sequence patenting opponents are sum-
marized in Michael Crichton’s statement in the New York Times, in
which he boldly stated:
You, or someone you love, may die because of a gene patent that should never
have been granted in the first place. . . . Gene patents are now used to halt
research, prevent medical testing and keep vital information from you and
your doctor.  Gene patents slow the pace of medical advance on deadly dis-
eases.  And they raise costs exorbitantly . . . . [b]ecause the holder of the gene
patent can charge whatever he wants, and does. . . . The gene may exist in
your body, but it’s now private property.3
If true, Crichton’s claims would certainly cast a dark light on the prac-
tice of genetics patenting.  Statements such as Crichton’s are cur-
rently in vogue, and support of such sentiments is gaining momentum
even at the policymaking level.  In 2007, at the urging of Crichton,
Congressmen Xavier Becerra and Dave Weldon introduced the Geno-
mic Research and Accessibility Act (GRAA).4  The GRAA, if passed,
would have established that “no patent may be obtained for a nucleo-
tide sequence, or its functions or correlations, or the naturally occur-
ring products it specifies.”5  Although the GRAA did not move out of
committee, its breadth was startling.  Based on the plain language of
the bill, it not only would ban the patenting of gene sequences them-
selves, but also would potentially ban the patenting of methods de-
rived from gene sequences.6
Undeterred by the 2007 GRAA failure, the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU) pushed forth in AMP, alleging that patents held by
Myriad Genetics pertaining to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene se-
quences, associated with hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, are
1. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2. See John Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Judge Invalidates Human Gene Patent,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, at B1; Sharon Begley, In Surprise Ruling, Court De-
clares Two Gene Patents Invalid, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 29, 2010), http://
www.newsweek.com/blogs/the-human-condition/2010/03/29/in-surprise-ruling-
court-declares-two-gene-patents-invalid.html.
3. Michael Crichton, Editorial, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at A23.
4. See H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007); Robert Cook-Deegan, Gene Patents, HASTINGS
CENTER, http: // www . thehastingscenter . org / Publications / BriefingBook / Detail.
aspx?id=2174 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
5. H.R. 977 § 2(a).
6. Id.; Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation
and Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295,
296 (2007).
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patent ineligible because they cover “products of nature, laws of na-
ture and/or natural phenomena, and abstract ideas or basic human
knowledge or thought.”7  The ACLU further claimed that the Myriad
patents create a monopoly that inhibits research, limits women’s
healthcare options, and is unconstitutional.8
Judge Robert W. Sweet of the Southern District of New York sur-
prised nearly all those in the genetics community when he found Myr-
iad’s patents ineligible under section 101 of the U.S. patent statute.9
Noting the unique information-carrying character of gene sequences,
Judge Sweet departed from the traditional products of nature analysis
and, instead of focusing on physical and functional differences, based
his decision on the commonality of the information carried on the na-
tive DNA and Myriad’s cDNA sequences.10
Only days after the AMP ruling, echoing the allegations made by
the ACLU, Congressman Becerra rejoined the fray by pronouncing
that he would “once again introduce legislation banning gene patent-
ing to ensure patients’ access to their own medical information, reduce
the costs of gene tests and increase scientific research into personal-
ized medicine.”11  Moreover, in his proposed 2010 version of the
GRAA, Becerra reportedly seeks to expand the 2007 version by ex-
tending the proposed prohibition on gene patenting to all species, in-
cluding animals and plants.12
As expected, Myriad has filed a notice of appeal with the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, thus bringing the gene
sequence patent question before the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC).13  While the CAFC has not yet weighed in on the mat-
ter, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) surprisingly filed
an amicus brief with the CAFC.14  In its brief, the DOJ has taken a
7. Complaint at 29, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Of-
fice, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515).
8. Id. at 18–19; Ann Weilbaecher, Can Patent Protections Trample Civil Liberties?
The ACLU Challenges the Patentability of Breast Cancer Genes, 15 PUB. INT. L.
REP. 10, 10–11 (2009); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN
GENE PATENTS 1, 5 (2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/freespeech/
brca_qanda.pdf [hereinafter “ACLU STATEMENT”].
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 238.
10. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 228–32.
11. Press Release, Congressman Xavier Becerra, Rep. Becerra Applauds Court Deci-
sion on Gene Patenting (Mar. 30, 2010), available at http://becerra.house.gov/in-
dex.php?option=Com_content&view=article&id=412:rep-becerra-applauds-court-
decision-on-gene-patenting&catid=3:press-releases&Itemid=4#.
12. See Kevin E. Noonan, Congressman Becerra Once Again Tries to Ban Gene Pat-
enting by Statute, PATENT DOCS (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/
04/hes-baaack.html.
13. See Notice of Appeal, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09
Civ. 4515).
14. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (No. 09 Civ. 4515).
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middle ground by stating that genetic patents that require both isola-
tion and alteration should receive the benefit of patent eligibility,
while those patent claims directed merely at isolation of genetic mate-
rial should be denied such protection.15  Specifically with respect to
the Myriad patent claims, the DOJ asserts that patent claims directed
at complimentary DNA, discussed further herein, require both isola-
tion and alteration of naturally occurring genetic material, thus ren-
dering the Myriad patent claims eligible for patent protection.16  In
contrast, the DOJ opposes patent eligibility of patent claims directed
at genomic DNA, which the DOJ asserts merely amounts to isolating
the genomic DNA from the human body.17
A number of economic theorists have analyzed the usefulness of
the genetics patenting regime as an engine for innovation.18  Many
critics have pointed to the increased patenting activity in “upstream”
areas of the biotechnology industry as reason for concern, suggesting
that over-appropriation of upstream subject matter could lead to a
tragedy of the anticommons,19 resulting in a stifling of “downstream”
product and diagnostic development.20  Most of these theoretical
claims, however, fail to recognize aspects of reality which act to miti-
gate the anticommons effect, such as the inertia required for a paten-
tee to impose his exclusive right on an academic researcher,21 the
large amount of upstream subject matter controlled by publicly funded
agencies,22 and the fact that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and the courts have drawn a line demarking non-appropria-
ble upstream subject matter by essentially banning patents on express
15. Id. at 9–10.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 10.
18. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575 (2003); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Rich-
ard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The
Case for Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 251 (2007).
19. See infra section V.B.
20. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1611; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18, at
699; Wang, supra note 18, at 258–61.  The terms “upstream” and “downstream”
denote the relative position of a particular piece of subject matter in the funda-
mental research-to-consumer ready production continuum.  The more “upstream”
a piece of subject matter resides the closer that subject matter is to pure funda-
mental research having no direct consumer utility.  In contrast, the more “down-
stream” a piece of subject matter is the closer that subject matter is to supplying
direct consumer utility.
21. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking
the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (2008).
22. Chester J. Shiu, Of Mice and Men: Why an Anticommons Has Not Emerged in the
Biotechnology Realm, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 413, 415 (2009).
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sequence tags (ESTs).23  Much in the same way non-zero transaction
costs in the real world cause social efficiency to fall below idealized
Coasian levels in a private property regime,24 costs of patent enforce-
ment can inhibit the emergence of the tragedy of the anticommons.25
Indeed, empirical studies suggest that the anticommons concern is
largely exaggerated, as only a very small percentage of researchers
indicate that licensing requirements or the existence of patents im-
pact their activities.26
Unfortunately, much of the outcry which has seemingly driven the
ACLU’s course of action in AMP is based on the assumption that gene
patents inhibit research and make medical care more expensive.27
While gene patents, just as any other class of patents, provide a lim-
ited right of exclusivity to the patentee, temporarily restricting a com-
petitor’s access to related subject matter, critics overlook the positive
aspects of patent protection, namely private investment and the re-
sulting advances in technology.  Irrespective of the outcome in AMP,
the continued use of gene sequence patenting as a tool in the United
States’ innovation policy should not hinge on hyperbole.  Rather, the
future of gene sequence patents should be based on (1) whether gene
sequence patents meet the technical and legal requirements of patent
eligibility under section 101 of the patent statute, and (2) whether
gene sequence patents hinder or stimulate innovation in the biotech-
nology industry.
While statements such as Crichton’s and Congressman Becerra’s
are currently fashionable,28 it is important for the courts, lawmakers,
and the public to appreciate the full implications of abandoning the
gene patenting regime.  Just as a truly malfunctioning gene patenting
regime would certainly lead to detrimental effects felt by researchers
and patients, abandoning a functioning regime would have an equally
negative impact.  If gene patents do, in fact, provide more societal ben-
efit than cost, then “[y]ou, or someone you love, may die”29 because
biotechnology firms were unable to attract the capital necessary to
bring to the market the fruits of their ground-breaking genetics
research.
Part II of this Article introduces the scientific background neces-
sary to understand the practice of gene sequence patenting from a
technical perspective.  This Part will dispel a number of misconcep-
23. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369–78 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Utility Examination
Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02, 1,095 (Jan. 5, 2001).
24. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
25. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1062.
26. Id. at 1061.
27. See ACLU STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 1.
28. See Crichton, supra note 3; Press Release, Congressman Xavier Becerra, supra
note 11.
29. Crichton, supra note 3.
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tions related to the practice of gene sequence patenting, specifically
what a gene patent represents and the limited bundle of exclusionary
rights a gene sequence patent provides.  This Part will also explain,
from a technical perspective, the difference between non-patent eligi-
ble native DNA sequences and patent eligible man-made cDNA gene
sequences.
Part III introduces and attempts to synthesize the century-long
products of nature doctrine, which supplies the standard for composi-
tion patent eligibility under section 101 of the patent statute.30  Addi-
tionally, this Part includes a discussion of the heightened utility
standards promulgated by the USPTO31 and adopted by the In re
Fisher court,32 which has severely limited the practice of patenting
upstream subject matter such as gene fragments and ESTs.
Part IV of this Article constructs an alternative standard for pat-
ent eligibility of genetic composition claims which simultaneously ap-
plies an information preemption analysis in concert with a functional
and physical difference analysis under the products of nature doc-
trine.  This Part further explains Judge Sweet’s erroneous application
of the “markedly different” standard under the products of nature doc-
trine to only the informational character of native DNA and the cDNA
sequences claimed in Myriad’s patents.33
Part V of this Article introduces the underlying patent prospect
theory used to justify the granting of patent rights.  This Part de-
scribes the theory of the tragedy of the anticommons and its applica-
tion to the biotechnology industry.  In doing so, this Part introduces
theories which suggest that the proliferation of patents in areas of up-
stream research, such as gene sequences, may amplify the risk of the
tragedy of the anticommons.  Part V further explains how factors such
as large public agency control of upstream subject matter, enforce-
ment costs on patent holders, and the stricter utility requirements
promulgated by the USPTO all act to mitigate anticommons effects.
Finally, this Part provides an overview of mitigating options, such as a
statutory experimentation defense and expanded march-in rights,
available to Congress to help stave off any threat of an anticommons
market malfunction.
II. CLARIFICATIONS AND SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
Much of the backlash against the practice of gene sequence patent-
ing is a result of widespread misunderstanding as to what a “gene pat-
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
31. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001).
32. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
33. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 227–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 310 (1980)).
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ent” actually represents.  For example, some critics have suggested
that an individual might be guilty of patent infringement simply be-
cause his body contains a patented gene.34  Congressman Becerra
even suggested that “we have absolutely no say in what [gene patent
owners] do with our genes.”35  The reality is that gene sequence pat-
ents do not and cannot produce a positive property right in a person’s
genes as suggested by these hyperbole-laden criticisms.  To suggest
otherwise simply ignores both the fundamental way in which patent
protection operates and more specifically the scope of the subject mat-
ter a gene sequence patent holder is provided.  In order to properly
understand why an individual’s genes are in no danger of appropria-
tion, one must first grasp an elementary understanding of genetics,
specifically the differences between gene sequences found in living or-
ganisms and the gene sequences that are protected in gene sequence
patent claims.
Since the founding discovery of J. D. Watson and  F. H. C. Crick, in
which the double helix structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was
deduced,36 the scientific community has recognized DNA and
ribonucleic acid (RNA) as the carriers of genetic information in all life
forms on Earth.37  From a chemical perspective, DNA consists of two
long anti-parallel polymer chains, known as nucleotides.38  Each nu-
cleotide backbone is comprised of sugar and phosphate groups,
wherein each sugar is attached to one of four bases.39  These bases
include Adenine (A), Cytosine (C), Guanine (G), and Thymine (T).40
The sequence of these bases along the DNA polymer backbone acts to
encode genetic information, with each nucleotide sequence arrange-
ment representing a different information set.41  The genetic code
serves as the keystone between a DNA sequence and a corresponding
protein, specifying the sequence of amino acids within a given pro-
tein.42  The genetic code consists of codons, with each codon made up
of a different three-base triplet of the four bases types, creating a total
of sixty-four possible codons.43  These sixty-four possible codons corre-
34. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1,093.
35. 153 CONG. REC. 3,637 (2007).
36. See J. D. Watson & F. H. C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Struc-
ture for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953).
37. See Eric S. Lander & Robert A. Weinberg, Genomics: Journey to the Center of
Biology, 287 SCI. 1777 (2000). See generally HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR
CELL BIOLOGY (3d ed. 1995).
38. LODISH ET AL., supra note 37, at 104.
39. Id. at 102.
40. Id.
41. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp.
2d 181, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
42. Id. at 194–96; LODISH ET AL., supra note 37, at 113–14.
43. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194; LODISH ET AL., supra note
37, at 120.
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spond to the twenty amino acids.44  As a result, the genetic code is
degenerate, meaning a given amino acid may have more than one pos-
sible codon, as most do.45
In all animal species nearly all encoding portions of a gene, known
as exons, are interspersed with non-encoding sequences, known as in-
trons.46  More specifically, introns do not encode for the protein corre-
sponding to the gene in question.47  Thus, in order for a DNA sequence
to code for a particular protein several intermediate steps must occur.
First, the entire gene, both exons and introns, is transcribed into pre-
messenger RNA (pre-mRNA).48  Then, via splicing, the non-coding in-
trons are deleted from the RNA sequence, resulting in a mature
mRNA sequence containing only the exons used to code for the protein
in question.49  In the cell, the mature mRNA is transported from the
nucleus to the cytoplasm, where it serves as a template in the assem-
bly of the protein.50
Geneticists take advantage of this natural process to create man-
made DNA copies of the isolated mature mRNA sequences.51  This is
particularly advantageous because the mRNA molecule is relatively
instable, making DNA a superior research tool.52  In doing so, scien-
tists isolate a given mRNA sequence containing only coding exons,
and then create a complimentary DNA (cDNA) sequence.53  It is this
man-made cDNA molecule that is sequenced, in which the order of the
four bases in the given sequence is determined, and patented.54  This
cDNA molecule can then be used in downstream applications such as
gene therapy, diagnostic testing, research tools, and purified protein
production.55
Researchers are not restricted from using a given gene and the cor-
responding genetic information.  In actuality, USPTO requirements
mandate that gene sequence data be disclosed in exchange for the cor-
responding patent right.56  As a result, gene sequence data is freely




48. See id. at 197–98.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see LODISH ET AL., supra note 37, at 234–36.
51. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 198–99.
52. See id. at 199; LODISH ET AL., supra note 37, at 234–36.
53. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 198–99.
54. See id. at 198–200; LODISH ET AL., supra note 37, at 234–36.
55. Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: Free Riders, Hold Ups, and the
Future of Medical Breakthroughs, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221, 227–29 (2003);
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, Access to Bio-Knowledge: From Gene Patents to
Biomedical Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. N1, ¶ 17 (2010).
56. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02, 1,095 (Jan. 5, 2001)
(citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2000)).
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and systematically made available to the public.  Researchers can
then use the native genes and/or the genetic information to identify
genetic polymorphisms, make gene sequence comparisons, produce
protein via recombinant processes, or perform an array of other scien-
tific studies, irrespective of the scope of an existing cDNA gene
patent.57
Critics also consistently claim that over 20% of genes are pat-
ented.58  This, however, is a very large misrepresentation.  In addition
to the physical differences between genes that reside in a person’s cel-
lular DNA and man-made cDNA gene sequences, as discussed above,
gene sequence patents only cover a narrow use for a given gene se-
quence.59  Studies have shown that a single gene sequence may be
claimed in up to twenty different patents.60  As a result, researchers
that reside horizontally to a given gene sequence patent holder are
still able to develop subject matter that implicates the given cDNA
gene sequence, provided they develop a use different from that already
patented—a desirable aspect of a functioning patent system.  When
combined with the ability to freely use the native gene and the corre-
sponding non-patent eligible genetic information, horizontal research-
ers are afforded a significant amount of breathing room.  Since a given
gene sequence patent only provides a right of excludability for the
claimed non-natural cDNA gene sequence and the corresponding use
of that gene sequence, it is absurd to contend that a patented cDNA
gene sequence somehow leads to an appropriation of the genes found
in a person’s body.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The constitutional basis for the patent grant is provided by the
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, which gives Con-
gress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”61  Congress has
generally taken a very broad and hands-off approach in delineating
what subject matter is and is not patent eligible under its constitu-
tional patent-granting authority.  Section 101 of the patent statute
provides that a patent may be awarded to “[w]hoever invents or dis-
covers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”62  Thus,
57. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372–74 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
58. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Gen-
ome, 310 SCI. 239, 239 (2005).
59. Ouellette, supra note 55, at ¶ 17.
60. Jensen & Murray, supra note 58, at 239.
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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the threshold requirements for patent eligibility under section 101
comprise “novelty, utility, and statutory subject matter.”63  In addi-
tion to these requirements, Congress further requires that subject
matter be nonobvious in order to receive patent protection.64  Con-
gress, to date, has purposefully maintained this agnostic approach to
patent eligibility affording the U.S. patent system the ability to adapt
with the ever changing technological regimes.65  The result, however,
is a statutory patent regime that provides very little guidance in
terms of patent eligibility, leaving the judiciary to determine the edges
of patent eligible subject matter.  Consequently, most of the biotech-
nology patent law doctrine has been gradually etched out in an ever-
evolving interplay between the subordinate federal courts, the Su-
preme Court, and the USPTO.
A. Products of Nature Doctrine
In terms of biological compounds and biotechnology in general, the
most widely utilized test for patent eligibility is the “products of na-
ture” doctrine.66  As a general matter, the patent law doctrine has
been described as forbidding the patenting of “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas.”67  These categories of patent ineligi-
ble subject matter are quite vague and take on very different mean-
ings depending on the technology contexts in which they are
implemented.68  In many ways, the products of nature test may more
aptly be looked at as a subset of the broader patent ineligible “law of
nature” baseline.69  With regard to compositions created by nature,
particularly biological compounds, the products of nature doctrine is
deemed by many to ban the patenting of “naturally occurring orga-
nisms and molecules.”70  There are, however, as will be outlined be-
low, many caveats to this understanding.71
One of the most famous and widely cited applications of the prod-
ucts of nature doctrine came in 1948 in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co.72  In Funk Bros., the Supreme Court held invalid a
63. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp.
2d 181, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A.
1979)).
64. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103.
65. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1630–31.
66. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 218–19.
67. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
593 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
68. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1577.
69. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
70. Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN.
L. REV. 707, 732 (2004).
71. See, e.g., Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131–32.
72. Id. at 127.
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product patent for a mixture of six bacteria species (genus Rhizobium)
that allowed inoculated plants to properly fix nitrogen from the air.73
The Court held that the patent amounted to a “discovery of phenom-
ena of nature” and the “qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the
sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men.”74  The Court, however, did provide some gui-
dance as to where the line between patent eligible and patent ineligi-
ble subject matter might lie by explaining that “if there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of
the law of nature to a new and useful end.”75  Provided the other stat-
utory patentability standards are met, Funk Bros. seems to suggest
that subject matter is patent eligible when a law of nature is applied
to a novel and useful purpose.76
While the products of nature doctrine represents a baseline for pat-
ent ineligible subject matter, it is worth asking these questions: First,
what products or processes truly constitute “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, [or] abstract ideas,”77 and second, what is required for an
invention to come “from the application of the law of nature to a new
and useful” end?78  Over a century’s worth of litigation in the biotech-
nology sector has, with mixed success, incrementally attempted to an-
swer these questions, significantly carving away at the seemingly
broad products of nature doctrine.
B. Natural Extracts Doctrine
One of the largest and most contentious carve-outs to the products
of nature doctrine is the “natural extracts doctrine.”79  In a general
sense, the natural extracts doctrine provides an exception to the prod-
ucts of nature doctrine for those creations in which human interven-
tion causes an extracted natural product to become a “new” product.
The larger question that the courts have struggled with is how to de-
termine whether an extracted product is in fact patentable.  As a re-
sult, the natural extracts doctrine has evolved over the last century
and a half in a series of sometimes inconsistent judicial opinions.80
73. Id. at 128–29.
74. Id. at 130.
75. Id.
76. Kane, supra note 70, at 734.
77. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
78. Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.
79. See, e.g., Allen K. Yu, Why it Might be Time to Eliminate Genomics Patents, To-
gether with the Natural Extracts Doctrine Supporting Such Patents, 47 IDEA 659
(2007).
80. Compare Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911),
with Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566
(1874).
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The following section summarizes the decisions most relevant to gene
sequence patentability.
In the context of biological products, Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K.
Mulford Co.81 is often referenced as the modern embodiment of the
natural extracts doctrine.82  In Parke-Davis, Judge Learned Hand
held valid a patent for purified adrenaline, an otherwise natural com-
pound existing in the human body.83  Judge Hand reasoned that upon
purification and extraction, the product became different from the nat-
urally occurring form of adrenaline and became “for every practical
purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically.”84  In his deci-
sion, Judge Hand took a very pragmatic approach, justifying his find-
ing of patent eligibility by pointing to the utility of the invention as
opposed to analyzing the technical scientific differences between the
purified adrenaline and the natural adrenaline.85  At the heart of the
question, however, Judge Hand may have simply struggled with the
realization that to some degree all products are in fact products of na-
ture, and therefore distinguishing a “man-made” object on the basis of
the underlying chemical makeup is probably no less arbitrary than
focusing on the utility of the “new” product when measured from a
therapeutic and commercial perspective.
Preceding Parke-Davis, in the 1874 case of American Wood-Paper
Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co.,86 the Supreme Court expounded on
the question of physical novelty.87  In American Wood-Paper, the Su-
preme Court held that a more purified cellulose product used in paper
production could not be considered a “new manufacture” in light of
“approximately pure” cellulose present in the prior art.88  The Court
further reasoned by example and provided that “if one should discover
. . . a process by which prussic acid could be obtained from a subject in
which it is not now known to exist, he might have a patent for his
process, but not for prussic acid.”89  The American Wood-Paper Court
did not seem to appreciate the “newness” of the purified material with
respect to the original naturally formed material, as it focused not on
the improved utility of the purified form, but on the physical similari-
ties between the new material and natural material.90
Decades after American Wood-Paper, the Supreme Court further
clarified the natural extracts exception to the products of nature doc-
81. 189 F. at 95.
82. See Yu, supra note 79, at 678.
83. Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 95; see Kane, supra note 70, at 739.
86. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874).
87. Id. at 593–95.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 594.
90. See id.
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trine in American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.91  The American
Fruit Growers Court, in analyzing whether an orange rind impreg-
nated with borax (used to prevent decay) constituted patent eligible
subject matter, found that the “[a]ddition of borax to the rind of natu-
ral fruit does not produce from the raw material an article for use
which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property,” thus
rendering the subject matter patent ineligible as a product of nature
rather than a manufacture.92
The Fourth Circuit in Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corp.,93 largely aligned its reasoning with that provided by Judge
Hand in Parke-Davis.  The Merck court, as in Parke-Davis, focused on
the new therapeutic utility of a purified B-12 vitamin produced
through the fermentation of a class of fungi.94  The court reasoned
that “[t]he patentees have given us for the first time a medicine which
can be used successfully in the treatment of pernicious anemia, . . . a
medicine subject to accurate standardization and which can be pro-
duced in large quantities and inexpensively.”95  The court then con-
cluded that “[t]he new products are not the same as the old, but new
and useful compositions entitled to the protection of the patent.”96
The Merck ruling would suggest that purification and isolation of a
compound which gives the new product a new utility not observed in
the natural form would lead to patent eligibility under section 101 of
the patent statute.
The Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty97 is often con-
sidered the case that opened the gates of section 101 of the patent
statute to the modern biotechnology industry, spawning a vast expan-
sion of private investment into the field.98  The Court in Chakrabarty
noted the expansive role of section 101 of the patent statute and re-
ferred to and adopted language from congressional committee reports
associated with the 1952 Patent Act, which indicated that Congress
intended to provide patent eligibility to “include anything under the
sun that is made by man.”99 Chakrabarty, however, outlined the
edges of this expansive view of section 101 patent eligibility by reiter-
ating that “[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
91. 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931).
92. Id. at 11–12; see also In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (holding that
“mere purification of known materials does not result in a patentable product,”
unless “the product obtained in such a case had properties and characteristics
which were different in kind from those of the known product rather than in
degree”).
93. 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
94. Id. at 157.
95. Id. at 164.
96. Id.
97. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
98. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 18, at 255.
99. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952)).
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ideas” are not patentable.100  Under its view, the Court reasoned that
“a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the
wild is not patentable subject matter.  Likewise, Einstein could not
patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have pat-
ented the law of gravity.”101  The Chakrabarty Court, however, did
conclude that the genetically altered bacterium in question indeed
constituted “[a] nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of
matter—a product of human ingenuity . . . . with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential
for significant utility.”102
C. Heightened Utility Standard
While the above cases address the eligibility of subject matter
under section 101 of the patent statute, none specifically discuss the
patent eligibility of gene sequences.  More recently, the courts and the
USPTO itself have addressed gene sequence patentability, even
though not on purely section 101 bases.103  Many critics have sug-
gested that the claiming of an isolated and purified gene sequence is
merely a “lawyer’s trick” that unfairly allows a patentee to appropri-
ate rights to genetic information created by nature.104  Many others
focus on the potential ill economic effects of patenting subject matter
that resides in upstream areas of research, pointing to past attempts
at patenting expressed sequence tags (ESTs) as evidence.105
ESTs are small portions of DNA sequence that represent portions
of expressed genes and can be used as tools to construct genome
maps.106  Critics claimed that ESTs resided too far into the upstream
portion of the biotechnology industry and that ESTs did not provide
any real world utility in and of themselves.107  Due to the upstream
location of ESTs, it was convincingly argued that limiting their use as
100. Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 309–10.
103. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Utility Examination Guidelines,
66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001).
104. E.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski,
Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to
Biotechnology Patents, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 301, 305 (2003)).
105. See, e.g., Jonathan Kahn, What’s the Use? Law and Authority in Patenting
Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 420–21 (2003).
106. See Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1367–68.
107. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 699.
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a research tool would greatly inhibit downstream development, while
providing no counterbalancing benefit to society.108
This concern, however, was largely addressed by the USPTO’s pro-
mulgation of the Utility Examination Guidelines and the courts’ sub-
sequent adoption of these heightened utility standards in the context
of gene patents.  The Utility Guidelines, in part, provide that “[i]f a
patent application discloses only nucleic acid molecular structure for a
newly discovered gene, and no utility for the claimed isolated gene, the
claimed invention is not patentable.”109  Moreover, the Utility Guide-
lines provide that the utility of the claimed isolated sequence must be
“specific, substantial, and credible,” having “particular practical pur-
pose . . . credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art.”110
The In re Fisher court largely adopted the standards set out by the
Utility Guidelines when analyzing the patentability of five ESTs re-
lated to maize genes.111  In finding that the ESTs were not patentable,
the court stated that “the claimed ESTs have not been researched and
understood to the point of providing an immediate, well-defined, real
world benefit to the public meriting the grant of a patent.“112  In sup-
porting the view proffered by the USPTO, the court set out the re-
quirements for substantial and specific utility.  The court concluded
that the substantial utility requirement required the patentee to
“show that the claimed invention has a significant and presently
available benefit to the public.”113  The specific utility requirement re-
quired the disclosure of “a use which is not so vague to be meaning-
less.”114  While these requirements do not preclude the patenting of
ESTs outright, they do require a patentee to identify a use that is
clearly farther down the innovation stream than their current pri-
mary use as a tool in gene sequencing.115  As a result, the patenting of
ESTs has largely been cut off, effectively drawing a line in terms of
how far upstream patents may flow.
In contrast, the USPTO establishes that patentability will arise
when the patent application discloses both the molecular structure for
a newly discovered gene and the utility of the claimed gene.116  This
dividing line should serve to chill the criticism that gene patents are
108. See id.
109. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02, 1,093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
110. Id. at 1,093, 1,098.
111. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1367, 1372.
112. Id. at 1376.
113. Id. at 1371.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 1368.
116. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02, 1,093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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sought opportunistically using only “lawyer’s trick[s]”117 and that en-
croachment of gene sequence patents into upstream work risks the
health of the genomics industry.
IV. ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY V. UNITED
STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE
The first analysis of gene sequence patent eligibility on section 101
grounds came in the recent AMP decision.118  Judge Sweet of the
Southern District of New York nearly single-handedly overturned
three decades of biotechnology jurisprudence by holding the subject
matter contained in Myriad’s composition and method claims pointed
to patent ineligible subject matter.119  The Myriad gene sequence pat-
ents implicated in AMP largely exemplify the canonical gene sequence
patents discussed in Part II of this Article.120  This Part will analyze
the patent eligibility of Myriad’s man-made BRCA1 and BRCA2 cDNA
gene sequence composition claims.  This Part will not address the pat-
ent eligibility of the method claims directed at diagnostic testing im-
plicating the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes,121 as they should be analyzed
under a Bilski-like analysis,122 and such an analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article.  Likewise, the constitutional arguments raised by
the ACLU in the AMP complaint123 are also beyond the scope of this
Article and will not be discussed herein.
The AMP court dismissed Myriad’s contention that the various in-
carnations of the products of nature test developed in Funk Bros.,
Parke-Davis, Merck, and Chakrabarty differ from the law of nature
test, such as that delineated in Diehr.124  Judge Sweet concluded,
“[a]lthough the distinction between [product of nature and law of na-
ture] categories is unclear, it is well established that ‘products of na-
ture’ are not patentable.”125  The AMP court is certainly correct in
concluding that neither products of nature nor laws of nature consti-
tute patent eligible subject matter.126  However, while much of the
prior analysis related to the two categories overlaps, one has to be cog-
nizant of the possibility that these terms are not necessarily inter-
changeable.  While the ultimate baseline for patent eligible subject
117. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp.
2d 181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Conley & Makowski, supra note 104, at
305).
118. See id. at 181.
119. See id. at 185.
120. See id. at 211–17; supra Part II.
121. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 232–37.
122. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
123. Complaint, supra note 7, at 29.
124. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 218 n.40.
125. Id.
126. See supra section III.A.
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matter mandates that “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas”127 do not fall within the scope of section 101, a product of
nature is not necessarily equivalent to these terms, from either a sci-
entific or jurisprudential perspective.  To compound the confusion, the
terms are often used nearly interchangeably throughout the case
law.128  Upon close reading, however, it becomes evident that in most
composition cases courts first establish the law of nature baseline and
then continue by undergoing the more tailored calculus required to
determine whether an invented composition constitutes a product of
nature or is instead a product of “human ingenuity.”129  For example,
the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty relied on prior court dicta to reit-
erate that “[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable, thus establishing the law of nature base-
line.130  The Chakrabarty Court, however, then went on to establish
the metric that a composition would be measured by, namely the prod-
uct of human ingenuity standard, which requires the new product be
“markedly different” than the product found in nature.131
The rule in Chakrabarty, however, should not be interpreted as the
only measure by which to determine whether subject matter clears the
law of nature baseline.  For instance, the Supreme Court in Diamond
v. Diehr132 applied an information preemption analysis when consid-
ering whether the implementation of a mathematical formula in a pat-
ent claim constituted patenting a law of nature.133  In Diehr, the
Court asked whether a process for molding rubber, which imple-
mented a mathematical formula in a computer system context, consti-
tuted patent eligible subject matter.134  The Court noted that “when a
claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phe-
nomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim
is seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract.”135  Reit-
erating the holding in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp.
of America,136 the Diehr Court attempted to draw the line between
patent eligible and patent ineligible subject matter by pointing out
that “[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is
not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with
127. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
128. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
129. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
130. Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130; O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 62, 112–21 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853)).
131. Id. at 309–10.
132. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
133. See id.
134. Id. at 191.
135. Id.
136. 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
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the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”137  The Court held
that the computer-executed process which implemented the Arrhenius
equation in one of the process steps was indeed patent eligible.138  The
Court concluded that the respondent’s “process admittedly employs a
well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt
the use of that equation.  Rather, they seek only to foreclose from
others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other
steps in their claimed process.”139  Thus, the patent law jurisprudence
would indicate that the products of nature test, formulated in Funk
Bros., Chakrabarty, and Merck, and the information preemption anal-
ysis, formulated in Diehr, are but subsets of the broader law of nature
baseline for purposes of section 101.  As a result, a court must look to
the details of the subject matter at hand when determining the analy-
sis which should be employed.  In the case of DNA, a court must look
to both its physical and informational duality when answering this
question.
Judge Sweet attempted to distinguish the subject matter related to
gene sequences by pointing to the duality of DNA as both a chemical
composition and an information carrier.140  The unique character of
genetic sequences is not under contention.  The information-carrying
capacity of natural DNA and man-made genetic sequences certainly
makes these molecules unique from a scientific perspective.141  Judge
Sweet, however, strained his analysis in order to incorporate a com-
parison of the informational character of the natural DNA and the
man-made gene sequences under the products of nature doctrine.142
This straining led to an outcome inconsistent with both the products
of nature line of cases under Funk Bros., Merck, and Chakrabarty, and
the information preemption analysis under Diehr.  The remainder of
this Part will discuss the AMP court’s treatment of the Myriad compo-
sition patent claims under the products of nature analysis, and set up
an alternative analysis under an information preemption framework.
A. Product of Nature Analysis – BRCA1 and BRCA2
From a precedential perspective, Judge Sweet went to great
lengths to avoid applying established products of nature doctrine to
the Myriad gene sequences.  Judge Sweet correctly pointed out that
“Supreme Court precedent has established that products of nature do
not constitute patentable subject matter absent a change that results
137. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (quoting Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94).
138. Id. at 187–88.
139. Id. at 187.
140. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 228–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 228–32.
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in the creation of a fundamentally new product.”143  As established in
Part III of this Article, what does and does not pass the product of
nature threshold is primarily a matter of the degree of “change” a com-
position from nature undergoes, and to some degree all new composi-
tions can be traced back to natural origin.144  The case law, including
Parke-Davis, Funk Bros., American Fruit Growers, Merck, and
Chakrabarty, provides a number of data points which occupy the con-
tinuum between patent eligible and patent ineligible compositions.
On one end of the spectrum, the Supreme Court in American
Wood-Paper held that refined and extracted cellulose from purified
pulp was patent ineligible because the resultant product was merely a
more pure version of the natural version.145  On the other end of the
spectrum, the court in Merck held that purified B-12 indeed consti-
tuted patentable subject matter as the purification led to more than a
“mere advance in the degree of purity of a known product.”146  The
delineating feature, which Judge Sweet correctly establishes, is “that
purification of a product of nature, without more, cannot transform it
into patentable subject matter.  Rather, the purified product must pos-
sess ‘markedly different characteristics’ in order to satisfy the require-
ments of [section] 101.”147
An additional data point that weighs heavily in favor of gene se-
quence patent eligibility is the ruling in Parke-Davis, where Judge
Hand held valid a patent for purified adrenaline on the basis of its
altered characteristics.148  Judge Sweet, however, dismisses the rul-
ing in Parke-Davis, concluding that Judge Hand erroneously relied on
novelty when holding that isolated adrenaline constituted patent eli-
gible subject matter because it was a “new thing commercially and
therapeutically.”149  Ironically, Judge Sweet himself points out that
patent eligibility turns on whether there is “a change that results in
the creation of a fundamentally new product.”150  Moreover, American
Wood-Paper, which Judge Sweet relied on heavily, found that the pu-
rified and isolated composition could not be considered a “new manu-
facture” in light of “approximately pure” cellulose present in the prior
art.151  While Judge Hand used the word “new” in Parke-Davis, it is
143. Id. at 222.
144. See supra Part III.
145. Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 593–95
(1874).
146. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958).
147. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 227 (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)).
148. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
149. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 224–26 (quoting Parke-Davis,
189 F. at 103).
150. Id. at 222.
151. Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 594
(1874).
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important to recognize that he did so in a manner that actually points
to the utility of the purified adrenaline in question.152  In so doing, he
firmly established that the purified adrenaline constituted patentable
subject matter because of its new commercial and therapeutic charac-
ter, which allowed it to be used by humans in a different way than in
its natural form.153  While a portion of Judge Hand’s ruling may no
longer be good law, it is clear that his “new . . . commercial[ ] and
therapeutic[ ]”154 character justification for finding that the purified
and isolated adrenaline constituted patent eligible subject matter is
entirely consistent with the markedly different characteristics stan-
dard provided in Chakrabarty155 and the “distinctive form, quality, or
property” standard in American Fruit Growers.156  Therefore, it ap-
pears relatively disingenuous to distinguish Parke-Davis on the issue
of novelty.  In the end, Parke-Davis does not establish a particularly
unique rule in terms of the products of nature doctrine, but it does
establish a data point along the patent eligible-patent ineligible con-
tinuum that pushes isolated man-made gene sequences closer to the
patent eligible side of the line.
The most closely related data point found in the case law is Merck.
As discussed in Part III, the Merck court relied heavily on the func-
tional differences between natural B-12 and the new B-12 compound,
pointing out that while purification alone was not enough to establish
patent eligibility, when the new compound “ ‘is therapeutically availa-
ble and the [natural compound was] therapeutically unavailable—pat-
entability would follow.’”157  The court noted that the patented B-12
“did not exist in nature in the form in which the patentees produced it
and was produced by them only after lengthy experiments.”158
It would appear straightforward to apply Merck’s standard of ther-
apeutic availability as the measurable characteristic to be used under
Chakrabarty’s markedly different characteristics standard.159  Myr-
iad points out a number of aspects which would appear, under Merck
and Chakrabarty, to justify the patent eligibility of the isolated
BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences.160  And, indeed, Judge Sweet did con-
clude that Merck was “entirely consistent with the principle set forth
152. See Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
156. Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931).
157. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 163 (4th Cir. 1958)
(quoting Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co., 179 F. 701, 705 (7th Cir.
1910)).
158. Id. at 164.
159. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
160. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 227–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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in Funk Brothers and American Fruit Growers.”161  Rather, however,
than apply the logic proffered by the Merck and Chakrabarty courts,
Judge Sweet went to great lengths to distinguish the purification and
isolation of native DNA and the man-made production of cDNA from
the compositions discussed in the prior case law, concluding that the
functional advantages of cDNA, which make the information in DNA
useful, did not lead DNA and cDNA to be markedly different.162
Myriad first points out that, while in its natural state, DNA found
in the nuclei of eukaryotic cells is intimately intertwined with chromo-
somal proteins, together forming chromatin.163  As a result, isolated
DNA, which is devoid of these chromosomal proteins, is structurally
different than the chromatin found in the nuclei.164  Judge Sweet dis-
misses this argument, noting that “the proper comparison is between
the claimed isolated DNA and the corresponding native DNA, and the
presence or absence of chromosomal proteins merely constitutes a dif-
ference in purity that cannot serve to establish subject matter patent-
ability.”165  In doing so, Judge Sweet does not provide a reason as to
why the purification merely amounts to a “difference in purity” and
why it does not lead to a degree of increased therapeutic utility so as
to justify patentability as provided for in Merck.166  From a therapeu-
tic perspective, it is clear that but for the purification and isolation, as
claimed in the Myriad patents, the gene sequences in question would
be useless to mankind.167  The Myriad purification does not amount to
a mere marginal improvement of the level of purity, creating simply a
more pure version of the original DNA.  Rather, it creates a new com-
position both from a commercial and therapeutic perspective, and to
conclude it is merely a “purification”168 seems diametrically opposed
to the Merck court’s rationale.
Judge Sweet also dismisses Myriad’s contention that the Myriad
sequences should be patentable because the man-made BRCA1 and
BRCA2 cDNA molecules contain only protein encoding exons and do
not contain the introns that exist in corresponding native DNA se-
quences.169  With respect to Myriad’s cDNA sequences, Judge Sweet
relies on the fact that “the coding sequences contained in the claimed
DNA [are] identical to those found in native DNA.”170  He further ar-
gues that the “particular arrangement of those coding sequences is the
161. Id. at 227.
162. See id. at 228–32.




167. Id. at 231.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 230.
170. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB101.txt unknown Seq: 22 12-AUG-11 14:06
2011] GENE SEQUENCE PATENTS 217
result of the natural phenomena of RNA splicing.”171  In Merck, how-
ever, it was not the molecular differences between the B-12 composi-
tions that made the new B-12 composition patentable, but rather the
purification and isolation of B-12 that created a new material from a
therapeutic and commercial perspective that rendered it patenta-
ble.172  Judge Sweet focuses on the fact that the operative informa-
tional components of the isolated cDNA are the same as the operative
informational components of the native DNA and then concludes that
they are thus not markedly different.173  This is a significantly
strained reading of Merck.  Not only does he completely dismiss the
differences between the DNA and the cDNA from a chemical structure
perspective, Judge Sweet also overlooks the fact that in Merck the op-
erative characteristics of natural B-12 and the man-made B-12 were
the same.174  Rather, it was the creation of a new composition that
retained the operative character of natural B-12 but in a form thera-
peutically accessible to man which made it patentable.175  It is diffi-
cult to see how the creation of cDNA, wherein introns are removed
from the native DNA, making the cDNA useful to mankind,176 does
not pass the threshold established in Merck.
Moreover, Judge Sweet also dismisses Myriad’s contention that the
functional differences between the isolated DNA and the native DNA
should allow for patentability because the native DNA cannot be used
in “molecular diagnostic tests (e.g., as probes, primers, templates for
sequencing reactions), in biotechnological processes (e.g., production
of pure BRCA1 and BRCA2 protein), and even in medical treatments
(e.g., gene therapy).”177  It is only through the man-made production
of the cDNA molecule that the above uses of DNA can be realized.178
Judge Sweet essentially concludes that the functional differences do
not lead to patentability because the basis for the various uses of the
isolated DNA is the fact that the native DNA’s nucleotide sequence is
preserved in the isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA.179  He then states:
While the absence of proteins and other nucleotide sequences is currently re-
quired for DNA to be useful[,] . . . the purification of native DNA does not alter
its essential characteristic—its nucleotide sequence—that is defined by na-
171. Id.
172. See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161–64 (4th Cir.
1958).
173. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 230–32.
174. See Merck, 253 F.2d at 156; Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at
230–32.
175. See Merck, 253 F.2d at 164.
176. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 198–99, 231.
177. Id. at 230–31.
178. Id. at 230.
179. Id. at 231.
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ture and central to both its biological function within the cell and its utility as
a research tool.180
Again, while Judge Sweet’s position is defensible from a purely se-
mantical perspective, in that the native and isolated sequences do
share important characteristics, he completely ignores the meaning of
Merck and Chakrabarty.  The Merck court clearly established that
changes in therapeutic utility should be looked upon when analyzing
whether the character of a natural product and an isolated product
are different for purposes of eligibility.181  In fact, in Judge Sweet’s
own words, “the absence of proteins and other nucleotide sequences is
currently required for DNA to be useful.”182  This observation is di-
rectly in line with the reasoning provided in Merck, Chakrabarty,
Funk Bros., American Wood-Paper, and Parke-Davis, and which
should lead to patent eligibility.
For example, if Judge Sweet’s analysis were applied to the facts in
Merck it would become apparent that natural B-12 and the isolated
and purified B-12, when measured from a molecular perspective,
would share the same “essential characteristics.”183  However, the iso-
lated B-12 product in Merck was patentable not because it was molec-
ularly different than natural B-12, but because it existed in an
isolated and purified state which led it to be useful to mankind in a
manner it was not when in its natural state.184  This same rationale
applies to the purified and isolated adrenaline in Parke-Davis,185 but
is distinguishable from Funk Bros. in that the purified cellulose in
that case was simply more purified with respect to natural cellulose
and did not fundamentally change the utility of the product when
measured from a therapeutic or commercial perspective, but only in-
creased the utility by some incremental degree.186  In the case of the
isolated gene sequences, it is only through isolation and purification
that the nucleotide sequences become useful to mankind in the first
place.187  The isolation and purification of the BRCA1 and BRCA2
gene sequences, therefore, must be looked at as a fundamental change
in character—amounting to an alteration of the sequences—consis-
tent with the outcomes in Merck and Parke-Davis, as opposed to an
incremental change in purity as observed in Funk Bros.
Judge Sweet claims to have applied the products of nature test in
AMP, but nevertheless completely disregards the physical and func-
180. Id.
181. See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir.
1958).
182. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
183. Id.; see Merck, 253 F.2d at 156.
184. See Merck, 253 F.2d at 163–64.
185. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
186. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1948).
187. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
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tional differences existing between the native DNA and the Myriad
gene sequences—hallmarks of the products of nature test.188  The
products of nature test was not developed to compare information
commonality, as nearly all compositions in the products of nature ju-
risprudence constitute non-genetic materials.189  Moreover, the Su-
preme Court rulings in Chakrabarty and Diehr indicate that a court
should not robotically apply the markedly different standard to the
informational character of native DNA and corresponding cDNA, as
the common information carriage does not preclude the possibility
that the two sets of molecules are markedly different from a therapeu-
tic and commercial perspective.190  By overlooking this divergent
treatment of information and composition, and by focusing on the
commonalities of the native DNA and cDNA, while at the same time
ignoring physical and functional differences, Judge Sweet warped the
products of nature doctrine into a test that would likely not be passed
by most of the subject matter that was used to develop it.
B. Law of Nature – BRCA1 and BRCA2
A number of commentators have suggested applying a law of na-
ture test when analyzing the patentability of isolated gene se-
quences.191  In doing so, Eileen Kane, a staunch opponent of gene
sequence patents, points out that “the genetic code should be charac-
terized as a law of nature, based on its essential attributes, its histori-
cal treatment in scientific literature and public discourse, and its
centrality in modern molecular biology.”192  In making this conclu-
sion, Kane further advocates for a treatment of the genetic code and
DNA under an information preemption analysis developed in the
software/algorithm patent law context.193
1. Isolated Gene Sequences Are Not Embodiments of the Laws of
Nature
Whether Kane is correct and the genetic code is considered a law of
nature for purposes of patent law doctrine may be an arguable point.
That issue will not, however, be argued herein as there is no question
of the fundamental and informational nature of the genetic code.
188. See id. at 222–32.
189. See, e.g., Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 127.
190. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980).
191. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J.
721, 724 (1990) (quoting Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130); Kane, supra note 70, at
744; Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New
Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 836 (1999).
192. Kane, supra note 70, at 752.
193. Id. at 752–53.
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While it is true that DNA contains a physical representation of the
genetic code, it is also true that the native DNA molecule contains
much more than just that information, such as the noncoding introns
and numerous polymorphisms of the native DNA.194  Generally
speaking, the genetic code consists of a “set of rules by which informa-
tion encoded” in DNA or mRNA “is translated into proteins.”195
Therefore, even if the genetic code is a law of nature, the native DNA
molecule is not; rather, it is only a result of that presumed law of na-
ture.  Consequently, DNA should not receive treatment as a law of
nature under patent eligibility analysis.
Even more convincing is the fact that a portion of the Myriad
claims in question are directed toward man-made cDNA, which is de-
rived from native DNA and is void of the noncoding introns and nu-
merous polymorphisms found in native DNA.196  This fact is often
overlooked by the popular media and critics,197 but it is a fact that
clearly pulls the Myriad gene sequences even farther from the realm
of law of nature.  The idea that cDNA is patentable even though it is
derived from DNA is further supported by both Supreme Court rul-
ings in Diehr and Mackay Radio,198 with the conclusion that “a novel
and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific
truth may be” patent eligible.199
Since native DNA and surely the isolated Myriad cDNA gene se-
quences do not exemplify laws of nature for the purposes of patent law
doctrine, an information preemption analysis under Diehr is not war-
ranted.  This, however, does not automatically lead to patent eligibil-
ity.  It is recognized that native DNA is certainly a product of
nature,200 just as native B-12 in Merck and natural adrenaline in
Parke-Davis were products of nature.201  This fact likely establishes
that native DNA is not patent eligible, a conclusion that many gene
sequence patent proponents would not dispute.  In its analysis, the
CAFC, and eventually the Supreme Court, should turn to the question
of whether the isolated Myriad sequences constitute products of
human ingenuity, with functional and physical attributes that are
markedly different than the native DNA.202  This is distinguishable
194. See generally LODISH ET AL., supra note 37.
195. Genetic Code, SCI. DAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/articles/g/genetic_code.
htm (last visited May 19, 2011).
196. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 198–99, 211–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
197. See, e.g., Crichton, supra note 3.
198. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
199. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (quoting Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94).
200. E.g., Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02, 1,093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
201. See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958);
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
202. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980).
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from the approach taken by Judge Sweet in that the informational
character of the native DNA and cDNA sequences should only be ana-
lyzed under the approach set out in Diehr, whereas the functional and
physical differences should be subjected to the products of nature
analysis discussed above.
2. BRCA1 and BRCA2 Patents Do Not Preempt Genetic Code
Even if one accepts that natural DNA is an embodiment of a law of
nature, this does not mean that the genetic information encoded in the
native DNA cannot be included in subject matter that is patent eligi-
ble.  As discussed above, the AMP court noted that a nucleotide se-
quence of the native DNA is preserved in the isolated BRCA1 and
BRCA2 DNA and erroneously applied the products of nature analysis
to conclude that the two were therefore not markedly different due to
information commonality.203  In order to properly analyze the infor-
mation commonality of the native and isolated gene sequences, the
court should have applied the law of nature preemption analysis for-
mulated in Diehr and suggested by Kane.204
By analogizing the mathematical formula implicated in Diehr to
the information content of the genetic code, the AMP court should
have analyzed the information preemptive effect of Myriad’s BRCA1
and BRCA2 patents.  Just as the mathematical formula in Diehr was
not patentable,205 neither is the information contained in the genetic
code, which is encoded in both the DNA and cDNA sequences.206  The
Diehr Court, however, established that the patent eligibility of an in-
vention did not hinge on the inclusion of a mathematical formula.207
Rather, the Court looked to the preemptive effect the issuance of the
patent would have on the use of the formula in other settings.208
Likewise, even if DNA is deemed as an embodiment of a law of nature,
which has been argued to the contrary,209 the validity of a gene se-
quence patent should not hinge on the inclusion of genetic information
in man-made cDNA.  The AMP court should have looked to whether
the Myriad patents preempt the use of the genetic information en-
coded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences in other settings.
It is true that the Myriad patent limits the use of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 sequences.  That is, however, the fundamental mechanism by
203. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 228–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
204. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; Kane, supra note 70, at 751–54.
205. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92.
206. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02, 1,093, 1,095 (Jan. 5,
2001).
207. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187–88.
208. See id.
209. See supra subsection IV.B.i.
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which patent protection provides incentive to invest.210  Simply be-
cause a patent limits one use of a law of nature should not lead to
patent ineligibility.  The raw genetic sequence data associated with
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 sequences can be used for a number of pur-
poses, such as sequence comparison and detecting polymorphisms.211
This is completely analogous to the limited but real uses that re-
mained in Diehr, wherein a subsequent party could still utilize the
mathematical formula present in the Diehr patent claim in contexts
that did not include the other steps of the patent.212  Moreover, in
nearly all gene sequence patent applications, the raw gene sequence
data is disclosed in the written description.213  Although not binding,
the USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines explain that “[w]hile de-
scriptive sequence information alone is not patentable subject matter,
a new and useful purified and isolated DNA compound described by
the sequence is eligible for patenting.”214  The Utility Guidelines fur-
ther provide that disclosed gene sequence data “represented by strings
of the letters A, T, C and G alone is raw, fundamental sequence data,
i.e., nonfunctional descriptive information.”215  Contrary to the con-
tention that gene sequence patents preempt the use of genetic infor-
mation, the USPTO mandates that the information cannot be
appropriated.
Judge Sweet himself states that the “requirement that the DNA
used [as a research tool] be ‘isolated’ is ultimately a technological limi-
tation to the use of DNA in this fashion, and a time may come when
the use of DNA for molecular and diagnostic purposes may not require
such purification.”216  This exemplifies a lack of preemption.  The
mere fact that the genetic information in question may be used in
other contexts and other technologies indicates that the genetic infor-
mation associated with BRCA1 and BRCA2 is not preempted.  Moreo-
ver, it represents one of the most important effects of a functioning
patent regime, in that it forces horizontal competitors to work around
the patents in question, thus developing adjacent subject matter.217
It is clear that the patenting of isolated and purified gene sequences
limits the use of genetic information, but it certainly does not preempt
it.  Therefore, the commonality of information in the native and iso-
210. Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1580.
211. See Jensen & Murray, supra note 58, at 239.
212. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187–88.
213. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02, 1,095 (Jan. 5, 2001).
214. Id. at 1,093.
215. Id.
216. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp.
2d 181, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
217. See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32996,
PATENT REFORM: INNOVATION ISSUES 3–5 (2005), available at http://www.lawand
innovation.org/cli/documents/crs_report_patent_reform.pdf.
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lated BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences should not lead to patent
ineligibility.
V. INCENTIVE THEORY
As discussed at the outset of this Article, proposals are once again
being made in Congress to fundamentally overhaul the genomics pat-
ent regime.218  Ideally, the success of these proposals will depend on
the usefulness of gene sequence patents in stimulating overall innova-
tion, as opposed to hyperbole-filled statements used to sway public
opinion.
In justifying a ban on gene patents, Crichton, the ACLU, Congress-
man Becerra, and others seem to simply conclude as fact that gene
patents limit research, increase the cost of healthcare, and limit peo-
ple’s healthcare options.219  Unfortunately, claims such as these are
made with little empirical support.  Moreover, critics often overlook
the very real possibility that without gene patents the healthcare op-
tions they so vehemently claim are too expensive might not exist at
all.220  In addition, criticisms of the genetics patent regime are often
applicable to the pharmaceutical industry, the medical equipment in-
dustry (e.g., MRI and topography technology), and virtually any area
of healthcare.221  In all cases, the market would provide cheaper alter-
natives to currently existing technologies if patents were simply elimi-
nated.222  That, however, is assuming those technologies would come
to market as efficiently as possible (or at all) in the absence of such
patents.  The less sophisticated criticisms refuse to consider the
broader innovation policy underlaying a functioning patent regime.
Rather, they tend to myopically focus on the cost of a single treatment
in existence today or the effect on an individual researcher or firm
who might potentially have to pay licensing fees to a patentee.223
These same critics often overlook the fact that the existence of patents
encourages competing horizontal entities to move to more fertile areas
of research and development, expanding society’s technological op-
tions and avoiding creation of redundant lines of technology
development.224
Any worthwhile analysis of the utility of patents in stimulating ge-
netics and biotechnology innovation must be based on a thorough and
nuanced study of the state of the genomics industry.  The question is
218. See Press Release, Congressman Xavier Becerra, supra note 11.
219. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 29; ACLU STATEMENT, supra note 8, at 6–7;
Crichton, supra note 3.
220. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1580.
221. See id. at 1581–95.
222. See id. at 1580.
223. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 7, at 29.
224. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 217, at 3–5.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-1\NEB101.txt unknown Seq: 29 12-AUG-11 14:06
224 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:196
not whether a single researcher is inhibited, or whether a single diag-
nostic test could presently be less expensive if a related patent was
invalidated.  These same arguments could be made with respect to
nearly any patented technology.  The ultimate question is whether the
genetics patent regime hinders or fosters overall innovation.  The an-
swer to this question is critical to fashioning appropriate public policy.
Fortunately, there are a number of thoughtful opinions on the mat-
ter, viewpoints which have looked at the gene patent regime from a
larger innovation policy perspective.  Several economic theorists have
suggested the possibility that over-patenting in portions of the bio-
technology industry, particularly in upstream regions such as genet-
ics, may lead to the development of an anticommons, creating a less-
than-optimal innovation regime.225  Other theorists have pointed out
that mitigating factors present in the real world cause these dire pre-
dictions to fall short.226  Ultimately, as the issue of genetic patenting
turns from the courts to Congress, lawmakers must consider the im-
pact gene patenting has on the genomics industry and supply a
gauged response.  This response may range from leaving the genetics
regime intact to banning genetic sequence patenting altogether, with
the possibility of implementing mitigating measures falling some-
where in the middle.  Congress’s ultimate goal, however, should not be
to justify one extreme or the other, but to craft a regime which will
optimize social good.
A. Prospect Theory
While numerous scholars have analyzed the role and the effective-
ness of the patent system,227 it is clear that from the outset of our
nation its primary purpose has been “[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts.”228  The extent to which patents are awarded, in
terms of scope, duration, and timing, is a topic for debate in nearly all
realms of innovation and technology.  However, in the case of biotech-
nology, and to a larger degree the genetics industry, many academics,
politicians, and public figures have taken a more apprehensive view
when asking when and to what degree patent protection should be
granted.229
From a general perspective, there are two commonly accepted
modes in which patent rights theoretically act to stimulate innovation.
225. See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 698; Wang, supra note 18, at 253.
226. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1061–63.
227. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 18; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18; Ed-
mund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977).
228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
229. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 698; Rai, supra note 191, at 827; Crich-
ton, supra note 3; Press Release, Congressman Xavier Becerra, supra note 11.
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First, patent rights have classically been thought to provide an ex
ante reward to a patentee, giving the patentee a temporary monopoly
on the commercial exploitation of the patented subject matter, incen-
tivizing the would-be inventor to invent.230  Edmund Kitch, however,
expounded on the utility of patents in his “prospect theory” by analo-
gizing patent rights to mineral rights in the American West.231  Kitch
believed that providing broad patent rights early on in the discovery
process gave a patent-holding entity the ability to develop a given
technology without competition.232  According to Kitch, provided that
resources were allocated efficiently, the patent right was owned by the
entity best equipped to develop it, and information was disseminated
efficiently between the various entities, then this prospect right, when
coupled with the ability to license or transfer the right, would lead to
the most efficient means of commercialization and product develop-
ment.233  In his theory, optimal efficiency is realized by allocating the
associated patent rights to a single entity, who may unilaterally man-
age downstream development activity or may alternatively sell or li-
cense the right to another entity who values the right to a greater
degree, and is thus presumably better positioned to develop it.234
In essence, Kitch’s theory is the intellectual property equivalent to
the private property solution to Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy of the com-
mons.”235  Hardin first introduced the concept of the tragedy of the
commons to explain the need for intervention when protecting scarce
environmental resources from over-exploitation.236  Harden described
a hypothetical group of cattle ranchers, each having open grazing ac-
cess to the same pasture.237  In this framework, an individual rancher
is not incentivized to conserve the pasture land because the negative
impacts of overgrazing are borne by all of the ranchers in the commu-
nity and only the individual farmer reaps the benefits of his graz-
ing.238  Hardin argued that because the individual rancher does not
feel the negative impacts imparted to the other farmers (i.e., the nega-
tive externalities), the rancher will not, and from a rational perspec-
tive should not, take those negative impacts into account when
deciding to increase the size of his herd.239  As a result, all ranchers
are incentivized to add more and more cattle to their herd and in the
230. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1600; Kitch supra note 227, at 266.
231. Kitch, supra note 227, at 266.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 266, 274.
234. See id.; Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1600.
235. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
236. Id. at 1244.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1244–45.
239. Id. at 1244.
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end the pasture is overgrazed.240  A common solution to the tragedy of
the commons is a market-based private ownership regime.241  Under
the idealized conditions put forth in the Coase Theorem, in a perfectly
frictionless market place, where property is tradable, transaction
costs to trade the property are nonexistent, information is perfect, and
actors are rational, the property is allocated in an optimally efficient
way, irrespective of the original owner of the good.242  This is because
in the no-transaction-cost world rational market participants most
valuing a given right (i.e., market participants who can put that right
to its greatest commercial use) will ultimately obtain that right, as
they are willing to pay the largest price for the given right and no
barriers to the transaction exist, allowing a given transaction to take
place solely on the basis of price.243  In terms of social efficiency, as
transaction costs tend toward zero, the observed efficiency tends to-
wards perfect efficiency, known as Pareto optimality, which exists
when no trade or redistribution can squeeze out any more social
value.244
The breadth of an underlying patent prospect claim serves as an
important parameter to consider when analyzing the efficiency of a
given regime and could serve as a potential “lever” when seeking to
more fully optimize the given system.245  Kitch believed that broad
patent rights could help avoid the over-fishing of a given area of sub-
ject matter, which according to Kitch leads to an inefficient out-
come.246  In contrast, however, Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard Nelson
argue that limiting the number of inventors who compete within a
given technological area runs the risk of having an area undeveloped
if the entity awarded the broad patent is not optimally suited to de-
velop the technology.247  They suggest that a balance should be
struck, where patent rights are broad enough to avoid overlapping in-
ventions, but narrow enough to encourage an array of inventors to de-
velop a given area of subject matter.248
An additional metric that may serve to define and adjust the rights
within the genetics patent regime is the timing of when a patent right
should be awarded.  Kitch believed that patent rights should be
240. Id.
241. See Coase, supra note 24, at 64–68; Hardin, supra note 235, at 1245.
242. See Coase, supra note 24, at 1–44.
243. See id.
244. Gerard Debreu, Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum, 40 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 588, 588 (1954).
245. Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1579.
246. Kitch, supra note 227, at 265; see also Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson,
Economic Theories About the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES
1031, 1042 (1998) (explaining Kitch’s theory as requiring broad patent rights in
order to avoid wasteful outcomes).
247. See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 246, at 1042–43.
248. See id.
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awarded early on in the development of a given technology, so as to
supply the grantee enough breathing room to effectively develop the
underlying subject matter.249  Much in the same way overly broad
patent rights can inhibit horizontal innovation,250 opponents counter
that rights awarded too far upstream in the research and development
process can inhibit vertical innovation, stifling downstream
development.251
Clearly, Coase’s world does not exist, a fact not lost on Coase him-
self, who developed his famous theory in part to highlight the break-
down of idealized property management regimes.252  Therefore, the
utility of Kitch’s prospect theory hinges greatly on the magnitude of
transaction costs, the quality of information, and the rationality of the
involved entities within an intellectual property regime.  Assuming
adequate information and reasonable rationality (sometimes a rela-
tively large assumption), the question is whether the transaction
costs, both vertical and horizontal, within the genetics patent regime
are small enough that more social utility is produced with gene se-
quence patents than without.  It is important to note, however, that
the legitimacy of genetic patents as useful engines of innovation stim-
ulation does not depend on whether transaction costs exist in the ge-
netics industry or whether genetic patenting can sometimes raise
downstream costs—there is little question that they do.253  Rather,
the question is how far from the idealized Coasean bargaining and
optimal social output levels does the genetics regime actually deviate,
and does that deviation create a situation in which more social utility
would be squeezed out of society through an alternative innovation
regime.
B. The Tragedy of the Anticommons
In any intellectual property regime that allocates rights of exclud-
ability in accordance with the Kitchean prospect theory or classical
reward theory, policymakers must be wary of the potential for an
emerging “tragedy of the anticommons.”254  A tragedy of the anticom-
mons is at risk of developing when multiple parties have ownership
rights in a particular resource, yet none of them have the right of ex-
clusion.255  Michael Heller first developed the concept of the tragedy of
the anticommons in an attempt to explain the inefficient use of com-
249. Kitch, supra note 227, at 269.
250. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1614.
251. See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 698.
252. See Coase, supra note 24, at 1–2.
253. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1611; Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1062.
254. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transi-
tion from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
255. Id. at 622.
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mercial property in post-socialist eastern European cities.256  Heller
observed that due to the large number of entities possessing rights or
licenses to a given store front property, it became nearly impossible for
any one individual to take control of the property and make use of
it.257  As a result, stores remained empty even though more easily as-
certainable kiosks sprouted up in droves.258  In a Coasian world, a
tragedy of the anticommons will always be avoided because transac-
tion costs are non-existent, information is perfect, and actors are ra-
tional.259  As a result, the various rights to a resource are aggregated
by the actor who most values use of that resource.260  Since a Coasian
world, however, does not exist, the tragedy of the anticommons can
only be overcome when transaction costs, information quality, and the
behavior of individuals remain workable.  If any of these factors grows
too unwieldy the market may freeze and the entire resource may be
wasted.
In 1998, Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg first extended Heller’s idea
of the tragedy of the anticommons to the burgeoning biotechnology in-
dustry.261  Typically, in a technology regime, anticommons theory
points out that the biggest risk of anticommons development exists
when upstream research becomes overly privatized, since that subset
of innovation serves as an input into the downstream commercial de-
velopment portion of the industry.262  The reason for this increased
risk is that transaction costs to bring a given product to fruition are
amplified because the licensee may have to negotiate with several
generations of underlying patent holders.263  Therefore, when an an-
ticommons emerges, or is at a great risk of emerging, the two most
common remedies to optimizing innovation are either aggregating the
various patent rights required to bring a given technology to commer-
cial fruition, or disallowing patenting in upstream portions of the ver-
tical market.264  In the case of biotechnology, Heller and Eisenberg
suggested that the escalation of patenting in upstream areas of the
biotechnology industry (e.g., gene sequence and gene fragment patent-
ing), which historically employed commons-based innovation fueled by
256. Id. at 622–24.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Coase, supra note 24.
260. See id.
261. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18.
262. Id. at 698–99.
263. Id. at 698.
264. Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1624.
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government funding,265 could stifle development in downstream bio-
technology markets (e.g., drug development).266
C. Evidence for the Anticommons
While several economic theorists have provided warnings of an on-
coming biotechnology anticommons,267 generally speaking little evi-
dence for such a market malfunction exists.  Even so, Congressman
Becerra justifies his attempt to ban gene patenting by claiming that
he has “long believed that gene patents hurt patients by limiting ac-
cess to life-saving tests and preventing scientists from conducting cut-
ting-edge research.”268
A survey conducted by John Walsh, Wesley Cohen, and Charlene
Cho of over four hundred genetic researchers indicated that only
about 5% of those researchers even question whether a given research
tool is patent protected when choosing to undergo a research project
using that research tool.269  Moreover, only 1% of respondents re-
ported having to delay or change the course of their research due to an
existing patent, while none of the researchers reported having to
abandon a project.270  A survey of scientists in the United States, Ger-
many, Japan, and the United Kingdom by the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), through its Project on Science
and Intellectual Property in the Public Interest (SIPPI), has also
yielded little evidence of an anticommons effect.271  In the United
States, for example, only 1% of the respondents indicated that they
abandoned a research project due to an existing patent.272  Further, in
their 2005 study, Zhen Lei, Rakhi Juneja, and Brian Wright found
that only about 10% of respondents indicated that they inquired as to
whether or not a research tool used in their work was patented.273
These studies clearly suggest that there is very little anticommons ef-
fect in upstream research and the concerns related to the inhibition of
upstream research activities have largely been exaggerated.
Theoretical predictions suggesting an emerging anticommons often
point to the sheer increase in the total number of biotechnology pat-
265. See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006)).
266. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 698–99.
267. See, e.g., id.
268. Press Release, Congressman Xavier Becerra, supra note 11.
269. John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents
and Material Transfers, 309 SCI. 2002, 2002 (2005).
270. Id.
271. Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1066–67.
272. Id. at 1067.
273. Zhen Lei, Rakhi Juneja & Brian D. Wright, Patents Versus Patenting: Implica-
tions of Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Research, 27 NATURE BI-
OTECH. 36, 37 (2009).
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ents issued over the last few decades as a reason for concern.274  For
example, Richard Li-dar Wang argues that the overall increase in bio-
technology patents, specifically upstream gene patents, is a reason to
expect a future biotechnology anticommons.275  David Adelman and
Kathryn DeAngelis, however, correctly establish that this approach is
far too simplistic and the reliance upon “patent counts” is a primary
reason for the “divergence between data and theory.”276  The complex-
ity of patent rights in biotechnology makes patent counting relatively
valueless in modeling the health of an innovation regime.277  The tim-
ing and scope of a patent right and the likelihood of its enforcement all
represent metrics that likely play a significantly larger role in the effi-
cient operation of a given innovation regime than the mere number of
patents in that regime.278
Eisenberg herself, in a follow-up study to her seminal work with
Heller, notes that one reason the dire anticommons predictions have
not yet come to fruition is due to the existence of a number of mitigat-
ing factors which act to stave off the onset of an anticommons.279  Ei-
senberg explains that the “burden of inertia” rests with a patent
owner to enforce their intellectual property rights against an infring-
ing party.280  In situations where the cost of identification of a user
and enforcement of the underlying patent rights is high, the likelihood
that a patent holder will attempt to enforce his or her rights dimin-
ishes.281  Moreover, as the reward for enforcing a patent lessens, the
likelihood of such enforcement also decreases.282  In many ways, this
represents the mirror image of the transaction costs which operate in
the Coase/Hardin tragedy of the commons framework, where the exis-
tence of transaction costs results in the observed market efficiency
falling below the theoretical optimality.283  In the patent enforcement
context, the existence of transaction costs in finding infringers and en-
forcing patent rights against them acts to mitigate the formation of
the theoretically predicted anticommons.284  Rather than serving as a
cause to the development of an anticommons, the searching and bar-
gaining transaction costs act as a buffer to academic researchers who
reside relatively upstream from commercial product deployment, as in
274. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 698–99; Wang, supra note 18, at 253.
275. See Wang, supra note 18, at 255.
276. David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1681 (2007).
277. See id. at 1682.
278. See id.; Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1062–63.




283. See Coase, supra note 24; Hardin, supra note 235.
284. Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1062.
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many cases it is simply not worth the effort to enforce a patent against
an infringing researcher.285  This dynamic at least partly explains
why no appreciable anticommons effect has been observed in up-
stream research activity.  It is imperative that policymakers note this
reality when considering whether to impose measures intended to
streamline transaction costs—such as compulsory license re-
gimes286—in an attempt to lessen the likelihood of an anticommons.
Otherwise, ignorance of this reality when reforming the genetic se-
quence realm of the biotechnology industry will likely result in re-
duced enforcement costs and, ironically, could potentially result in
increasing the likelihood of an emerging anticommons in upstream
portions of the industry.
Another mitigating factor inhibiting the creation of an anticom-
mons is the fact that a large amount of upstream subject matter is
under the control of publicly funded entities such as the National In-
stitutes of Health (NIH), which dole out research dollars to academic
researchers.287  Chester Shiu points out that NIH policies help stave
off an anticommons effect by (1) mandating liberal licensing of funded
research; (2) fostering the development of a pool of upstream innova-
tors that for-profit firms “dare not sue;” and (3) taking steps to thwart
the development of anticommons-based business models, such as by
releasing subject matter into the public domain.288  This represents a
contrast to the claims made by many gene patent critics that the
Bayh-Dole Act of the 1980s has led to an over-privatization of the up-
stream areas of the biotechnology industry.289  The policies of funding
agencies such as the NIH represent a healthy balance between funda-
mental research and the commercial interests fostered by the Bayh-
Dole Act.290
While there is little empirical evidence supporting the existence of
an emerging anticommons in the biotechnology industry, one cannot
simply rule out the possibility of an anticommons developing in the
future as a result of shifting norms.  The pertinent question is not
whether a growing number of patents in the biotechnology industry in
general might lead to an anticommons.  As discussed, there is little
evidence suggesting that a mere increase in the number of biotechnol-
ogy patents will have a significant impact on the industry as a whole,
and a mere scaling of the number of patents is unlikely to create a
fundamental change in the efficiency of the industry.  Rather, the
285. See id. at 1061–65.
286. See Wang, supra note 18, at 251.
287. Shiu, supra note 22, at 415.
288. Id.
289. Wang, supra note 18, at 256; see Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019
(1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006)).
290. See Bayh-Dole Act § 200.
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more precise inquiry, as originally suggested by Heller and Eisenberg,
and the issue to which policymakers should direct their focus, is
whether the creeping of biotechnology patents further and further up-
stream will serve as a trigger to the creation of an anticommons, re-
sulting in the stifling of innovation in downstream research and
development.291
One practice that Heller and Eisenberg pointed to that was partic-
ularly worrisome was the growth in patent applications related to
ESTs.292  More specifically, they directed their concern to the growing
practice of filing patent applications for ESTs and gene fragments
without identifying a “corresponding gene, protein, biological function,
or potential commercial product.”293  Based on this practice, there is
little surprise as to why Heller and Eisenberg expressed concern over
the potential development of an anticommons.  However, as discussed
in Part III, in 2001 the USPTO heeded their warning and promul-
gated more stringent utility requirements in the Utility Examination
Guidelines.294  These guidelines, after being embraced by the Fisher
court, severely limit the practice of EST and gene fragment patent-
ing.295  The new utility requirements effectively established an up-
stream line-in-the-sand that private appropriation cannot cross, one of
the classic cures to an anticommons.296  The upstream vertical extent
to which patent rights must be aggregated in order to bring a given
downstream product (e.g., pharmaceutical product) to market has
been largely capped by the heightened utility requirements promul-
gated in the USPTO Utility Guidelines and adopted by the Fisher
court.  As a result, the likelihood of an anticommons developing in the
downstream market due to the proliferation of upstream patenting is
greatly reduced.
In sum, the claims made by lawmakers and public figures sug-
gesting that gene patents limit healthcare access to patients and pre-
vent researchers from conducting research largely appear to be
untrue.  The reality is that scientists at the upstream level of research
are largely oblivious to patents covering portions of their research.
Researchers rarely pay patent licensing fees, and the associated pat-
ents are rarely enforced against these researchers because the burden
of inertia resides with the patent owner.297  Not only has no apprecia-
ble anticommons effect been observed, but enforcement costs, NIH pol-
icies, and the implementation of the USPTO Utility Guidelines create
291. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1076–78; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18, at
698–99; Ouellette, supra note 55, at ¶ 26–27.
292. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 699.
293. Id.
294. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001).
295. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
296. See Heller, supra note 254, at 641.
297. Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1062.
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a biotechnology regime where there is likely little risk of suffering
from a tragedy of the anticommons due to genetic sequence patenting.
D. Trade Secret and Contract Law
In addition to a potential anticommons effect due to the prolifera-
tion of patents, policymakers must be cognizant of the potential for
market breakdowns through other legal pathways.  One problematic
issue relates to the difficulty some researchers have experienced in
obtaining research tools and research materials.298  One study found
that while patents did not in themselves create delays or abandon-
ment in the biotechnology regime, 42% of respondents reported delays
in obtaining tools and materials for research, with a mean duration of
8.7 months.299  The tools in question ranged from information about
gene sequences and proteins to cell lines and microbial strains.300
The study concluded that the delays in acquiring the above research
materials and tools were a byproduct of patenting, as university ad-
ministrators forced academic researchers to protect their prospective
intellectual property rights using material transfer agreements
(MTAs).301  It was found that researchers were more often forced to
acquire a patented technology through MTAs than through patent li-
censes.302  The study concluded that delays in obtaining materials is
not because of “patents per se, but patenting as an institutional imper-
ative in the post-Bayh-Dole era.”303  While there is certainly truth in
this statement, it largely oversimplifies the matter.  The study’s au-
thors replace the idea of commercial interest in developing a technol-
ogy with patenting the subject matter related to that technology.
Granted, the realization of commercial interest in academic research
may have been stoked by the Bayh-Dole Act, causing academic institu-
tions to look at their academic research with commercial eyes.304  Re-
moving gene patents, however, will not likely end this practice.
In fact, the banning of gene patents will likely exacerbate the effect
observed by the study’s authors.  The use of MTAs has been witnessed
in a vast array of areas implicating genetics and biotechnology, such
as transgenic mice and databases.305  For example, Stephen Munzer
points out that since the cutting off of EST patenting through the im-
plementation of the USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines in
298. See id. at 1063–64; Lei, Juneja & Wright, supra note 273, at 38; Ouellette, supra
note 55, at ¶ 71–77.
299. Lei, Juneja & Wright, supra note 273, at 38.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 36–38.
302. Id. at 38.
303. Id. at 36.
304. See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006)).
305. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1073–74.
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Fisher,306 entities have largely turned to trade secret law to protect
their intellectual property (IP) related to ESTs.307  Rather than hold a
patent, firms house their valuable IP in the form of secret EST
databases.308  If all gene sequence patents were cut off in a similar
way, it is quite likely that many firms would turn in part to trade
secret law to protect their IP, especially in areas where technologies
are expensive to reverse engineer.
Compounding the matter is the fact that the public will not reap
the benefits of open disclosure of gene sequence nucleotide data that
goes along with a gene sequence patent application.309  While trade
secret law will allow reverse engineering to freely occur, it will dimin-
ish information exchange, making it more difficult to build off the
work of others.310  As a result, market inefficiencies will develop due
to the replication of work and horizontal competitors will no longer be
forced to “invent around” the given subject matter by moving to more
fertile ground, stripping society of one of the positive byproducts of the
patent system’s road-block effect.311  There is little reason to expect
that the abandonment of the genetic patenting regime will result in
less delay and restrictions when seeking to acquire research tools and
material.  Rather, it will lead to an even further entrenchment of
MTAs and trade secret law, and will make information exchange and
cooperation even more difficult.   If Congress believes MTAs create an
impediment to research and development, then direct steps should be
taken to limit their use by firms funded by federal research dollars.  It
would be largely irresponsible, however, to restrict the patent regime
in the hopes of quelling the use of MTAs and risk both destroying the
positive impact patents provide and driving subject matter into trade
secret law.
E. Mitigating Measures Available to Congress
Although it is clear that the threat of an anticommons has been
largely exaggerated and there is no need to institute a wholesale ban
on gene sequence patenting, Congress should still consider mitigating
the potential negative aspects of the patent regime through moderate
policy “levers.”312  Two measures most suitable for a diverse industry
306. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Utility Examination Guidelines,
66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001).
307. Stephen R. Munzer, Commons, Anticommons, and Community in Biotechnologi-
cal Assets, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 271, 284 (2009).
308. Id.
309. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1,095; supra Part II.
310. See Munzer, supra note 307, at 284.
311. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 217, at 4 (quoting Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents
and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1017, 1028 n.44 (1989)).
312. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1575.
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such as biotechnology, having a large vertical landscape with a signifi-
cant amount of activity occurring in upstream portions of the market,
are march-in rights and an experimentation defense.  These two miti-
gating mechanisms provide baseline protection against wasteful activ-
ity while at the same time   maintaining the incentives for commercial
investment created by a functioning patent regime.
1. March-In Rights
While prospect theory would dictate that it is largely inefficient to
have multiple entities developing a single area of subject matter,313
this idealization overlooks the reality that a patentee is simply unable
to develop all downstream applications, especially in an industry that
is as vertically extensive as biotechnology.  In most cases this limita-
tion is merely a byproduct of limited resources, but in some instances
an entity might actually be incentivized to refuse to develop a particu-
lar technology.  For example, Lori Andrews has suggested that Glax-
oSmithKline “has filed for a patent on a genetic test to determine the
effectiveness of one of its drugs, but will not develop the test, or let
anyone else develop it, possibly because such a test would cause the
company to lose customers.”314  In situations where a patent holder is
not actively developing or licensing a given patent for development,
such as in Andrews’s GlaxoSmithKline example, the use of march-in
rights315 may serve as a powerful tool to avoid a tragedy of the
anticommons.
Moreover, march-in rights already exist within the Bayh-Dole
framework.316  The Bayh-Dole march-in right provides a funding gov-
ernment agency the ability to unilaterally, or upon petition, disregard
the exclusivity of the patent holder’s patent grant, provided the
agency determines one of four conditions is met.317  Most pertinent to
the mitigation of an anticommons, the agency may impose march-in
rights when “action is necessary because the contractor or assignee
has not taken, or is not expected to take within a reasonable time,
effective steps to achieve practical application of the subject invention
in such field of use.”318  This right would be particularly useful when a
firm such as GlaxoSmithKline deliberately chooses not to develop pat-
313. See supra section V.A.
314. Lori B. Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property
Rights, 3 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 803, 804 (2002).
315. March-in rights allow the government “to step in and grant a new license or re-
voke an existing license if the owner of a federally funded invention (or the
owner’s licensee) has not adequately developed or applied the invention within a
reasonable time.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1052 (9th ed. 2009).
316. See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 203, 94 Stat. 3019, 3022–23 (1980) (codi-
fied as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006)).
317. Id.
318. Id.
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ented subject matter in order to leverage their position in a separate
technology.  A more robust march-in right tailored toward upstream
biotechnology patents, as opposed to only patents falling under the
auspices of Bayh-Dole, may be warranted.  While the details must be
carved out so that a company legitimately developing a technology, or
attempting to license it, is not unfairly stripped of its rights, this pro-
vision would help guard against spoiling of subject matter due to an
individual firm’s nefarious tactics.
2. Experimentation Defense
Additionally, patented gene sequences might also give rise to
breakthroughs in related areas of technology, wherein the gene se-
quences serve as a tool to map out new subject matter, and where the
resulting technology would not infringe upon the original patent.
While an earlier section outlines why enforcement of patents against
most upstream researchers is infrequent,319 it is not out of the realm
of possibilities that a patent holder might seek to enforce his or her
patent against a researcher.  The AMP case serves as a rare example
where a patent holder zealously enforced gene sequence patent rights
against academic institutions.320  In the case of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 gene sequences, Myriad held relatively strict control over the
patented subject matter.321  While it did provide access to a number of
academic institutions and cancer clinics, it limited their use to only a
handful of mutations.322  Further, Myriad did not allow the develop-
ment of other genetic tests based on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 subject
matter.323
As a general matter an experimentation defense324 already exists
within the patent jurisprudence.  The court in Madey v. Duke Univer-
sity325 delineated the lines of the common law experimentation de-
fense in a relatively narrow fashion.  The court held that “so long as
the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business
and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow . . .
experimental use defense.”326  This stance is remarkably narrow and
in most cases renders the defense useless.  Under the Madey ruling, a
319. See supra section V.C.
320. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
321. See Wang, supra note 18, at 295–96.
322. Id. at 295.
323. Id.
324. A robust experimentation defense would preclude claims of patent infringement
when “the construction and use of the patented invention was for scientific pur-
poses only.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 659 (9th ed. 2009).
325. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
326. Id. at 1362.
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university would fall outside an experimentation defense because one
of its business objectives was to attract research grants.327  As a re-
sult, it would seem that most academic researchers and their institu-
tions would be unable to avail themselves of the Madey-type
experimentation defense.
Congress should consider providing a statutory experimentation
defense provision for subject matter related to biotechnology.  In par-
ticular, Congress should focus its attention on upstream subject mat-
ter, which in many cases serves as a research tool in the investigation
of adjacent subject matter.  In situations where the secondary re-
searcher is not competing directly and commercially with the patent
holder, a statutory experimentation defense would save the secondary
researcher from a potential infringement action.  And while empirical
data shows that infringement action against upstream researchers is
quite rare, an experimentation defense would provide a baseline level
of protection against the more cutthroat commercial firms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and poten-
tially the Supreme Court, should apply a two-level analysis when de-
termining whether Myriad’s isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 cDNA gene
sequences meet the patent eligibility requirements of section 101 of
the patent statute.  First, the court should apply an information pre-
emption analysis, as set out in Diehr,328 to the genetic code informa-
tion encoded in the DNA molecules in order to determine whether
genetic code information is being preempted by the Myriad gene se-
quence patents.  A mere limitation on one type of use of the genetic
information does not qualify as preemption, just as the patented com-
puter program implementing the Arrhenius equation did not amount
to preemption of that equation.329  Since the genetic code information
is placed in the public domain upon patenting,330 other parties may
use the information in a variety of substantial ways.  As a result, the
genetic code information is not preempted by the patenting of man-
made cDNA sequences.
Following preemption analysis, the court should apply a products
of nature analysis consistent with Chakrabarty and Merck in order to
determine whether the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene sequences constitute
“a nonnaturally occurring . . . composition of matter . . . with markedly
different characteristics from” the natural DNA, “having the potential
327. Wang, supra note 18, at 262–63.
328. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
329. See id. at 191–93.
330. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1,092-02, 1,095 (Jan. 5, 2001).
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for significant utility.”331  In applying the products of nature test, the
markedly different standard should be used to analyze the functional
and physical differences between the native DNA and the cDNA mole-
cules, as opposed to the information commonality of the sequences.
The cDNA sequences represent man-made molecules which did not ex-
ist in nature prior to human intervention.  More importantly, the dele-
tion of the non-encoding introns does not create merely an
incrementally more pure substance, but rather a fundamentally new
composition that was not usable by mankind prior to the isolation.
Therefore, there is little question that the Myriad sequences, and
others like them, should pass the products of nature standard.  It is,
therefore, my contention that on appeal the Myriad gene sequences
should pass both information preemption and products of nature anal-
ysis and the AMP decision should be overturned.
Irrespective of the judicial decision in AMP, policymakers must de-
termine whether gene sequence patents foster or hinder innovation.
While many commentators have provided theoretical models in which
biomedical patents “may” lead to a tragedy of the anticommons, very
little empirical evidence points to a significant anticommons effect.
Just as transaction costs and imperfect information cause Coase’s the-
oretical optimal solution to the tragedy of the commons to fall short of
optimal efficiency,332 an anticommons will fail to manifest when the
inputs (e.g., vast private ownership of upstream rights, enforcement of
those rights, and/or compliance with those rights) into the theoretical
anticommons analysis fall below threshold levels.333  In other words,
just as reality forces efficiency to fall below optimal efficiency in the
Hardin and Coase framework, reality also may lead to a mitigation of
the anticommons effect.334
By and large upstream researchers ignore patents on tools and re-
search material and experience the most difficulty in obtaining tools
and materials when MTAs are used by the owner of the technology.335
Commentators have suggested that the existence of patents as an in-
stitutional imperative has created this problem, as university officials
mandate the protection of potentially patentable technologies.336
While it may be true that the Bayh-Dole Act opened the flood gates to
the commercialization of academic research, which was its intended
331. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980); see also Merck & Co. v.
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 164 (4th Cir. 1958) (holding that the
subject matter at issue was patentable because “products of great therapeutic
and commercial worth have been developed” from the subject matter’s “useless”
natural form).
332. See Coase, supra note 24.
333. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1061–63.
334. See id. at 1098–99.
335. See id.; Lei, Juneja & Wright, supra note 273, at 36–37.
336. See Lei, Juneja & Wright, supra note 273, at 36.
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goal,337 there is little reason to expect that simply abandoning patent-
ing in these areas will solve the delay and barrier problems created by
the use of MTAs.  In the event that gene sequence patenting is disal-
lowed, many firms and academics would stop the disclosure process
and much of the related subject matter would fall into the domain of
trade secret law and MTAs, as in the case of patent ineligible ESTs.
It is critical that lawmakers look to these facts and weigh them
heavily when considering the wisdom of stripping the genetics indus-
try of its patenting ability.  As a middle-of-the-road solution,
lawmakers may implement mitigating measures, such as march-in
rights and a statutory experimentation defense.  Implementing such
measures will help avoid the rare scenarios where an individual entity
fails to properly develop a given area of subject matter or is using
awarded patent rights to squelch basic experimental research.  Con-
gress may implement these measures as fail-safes, while at the same
time preserving the positive aspects of the current patent regime
which act to stimulate large sums of private investment in the bio-
technology and genetics industry, leading to new life-saving
technologies.
337. See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006)).
